1 Joseph Cropsey, "A Reply to Rothman," American Political Science Review (June, 1962) p. 355.
2 Henry Veatch, For an Ontology of Morals pp. 7-8.
3 See my article Don't Start with Archetypes" and Roderick Long's reply "In Defense of Archetypes: A Response" in Formulations Vol. IV, No. 3.
4 Ibid. p. 40.
5 The Ethics of Liberty p. 49.
6 Roderick Long has answered this question as well as many of the other ones that I have raised about archetypes. He has shown that a moral philosophy based on archetypes does not have to be vulnerable to some of the objections that I have raised. For Roderick Long's response to an earlier version of my scatter-shot assault on archetypes, see In Defense of Archetypes: A Response in Formulations Volume IV, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 39—42. I have made changes here as a result of Roderick's comments, but I still regard the archetype approach to morality as deeply flawed.
7 Bernard Gert, op. cit. p. 51.
8 Ibid pages 21 and 23.
9 Frances Hutcheson in British Moralists Volume 1 p. 405:
Were there no other Power in the Soul, than that of mere contemplation, there would be no Affection, Volition, Desire, Action. Nay without some motion of Will no Man would voluntarily persevere in Contemplation.
10 Frances Hutcheson op. cit. p. 406:
Thus ask a Being who desires private Happiness, or has Self-Love, "What Reason excites him to desire Wealth?" He will give this Reason, that "Wealth tends to procure Pleasure and Ease." Ask his Reason for desiring Pleasure or Happiness: One cannot imagine what Proposition he could assign as his exciting Reason. This Proposition is indeed true, "There is an Instinct or Desire fixed in his Nature, determining him to pursue his Happiness;" but it is not this Reflection of his own Nature, or this Proposition which excites or determines him, but the Instinct itself. This is a truth, "Rhubarb strengthens the Stomach:" But it is not a Proposition which strengthens the Stomach, but the Quality in that Medicine. The Effect is not produced by Propositions showing the Cause, but by the Cause itself.
11 Frances Hutcheson op. cit. pp. 405-406.
12 Richard Price in British Moralists Volume 2 p. 121:
There are, undoubtedly some actions that are ultimately approved, and for justifying which no reason can be assigned; as there are some ends, which are ultimately desired, and for chusing which no reason can be given. Were not this true, there would be an infinite progression of reasons and ends, and therefore nothing could be at all approved or desired.
13 Robert Andelson, op. cit. p. 46.
14 Ibid p. 83.
15 Rose Wilder Lane, Discovery of Freedom p. 77:
It is self-evident that man is not a cell in a commune or a mass or a class or a race, or an Immortal Italy or the German Race or the State, or in any other mystic bee-swarm that could be imagined. Everyone knows that he is himself, and that he controls his own acts—even though he may believe that this is not true of anyone else.
16 David Ritchie, Natural Rights p. 34:
...reason is not something that separates the judgment of one man from another. The appeal to reason is an appeal to the common reason of mankind.
17 David A. J. Richards in "Rights and Autonomy" Ethics Vol. 92 No. 1 pp. 6-7.
18 This paragraph is paraphrased from Bernard Gert op. cit. p. 15.
19 Leo Strauss, op. cit. p. 129.
20 Several arguments are used to dispute the fact that man has an innate appreciation for justice and morality (a moral sense). I put my replies to these arguments in Appendix A so that the main line of reasoning in this essay will not be obscured by this issue.
21 Rabbi Harlan J. Wechsler, What's So Bad About Guilt? p. 70.
22 Joel Feinberg "Human Duties and Animal Rights" in On the Fifth Day edited by Richard Knowles Morris and Michael W. Fox p. 56.
23 The Human Animal by Hans Hass p. 33-34. (IRM stands for innate releasing mechanism.)
24 Vance Packard op. cit. p. 101.
25 James Rachels op. cit. p. 157.
26 One way in which humans seem to be unique is that we are the only species that retains its natural curiosity after reaching sexual maturity. Hans Hass in The Human Animal p. 93 says:
Inquisitive behavior wanes or disappears completely in all learners after sexual maturity. This is not he case with human beings, who retain most of their youthful curiosity until old age.
27 Vance Packard op. cit. p. 115.
28 Charles Hartshorne "Foundations for a Humane Ethics" in On the Fifth Day p. 160.
29 Paraphrase of James Rachels op. cit. p. 160.
30 Paraphrase of James Rachels op. cit. p. 162.
31 James Rachels op. cit. p. 160.
32 Ibid. p. 161.
33 Charles Hartshorne "Foundations for a Humane Ethics" in On the Fifth Day p. 160-161.
34 Joel Feinberg "Human Duties and Animal Rights" in On the Fifth Day p. 50.
35 Ibid. p. 50.
36 Hans Hass op. cit. p. 186-187.
37 Joel Feinberg op. cit. p. 49.
38 The Structure of Liberty p. 24.
39 Ibid. p. 103.
40 Ibid. p.171.
41 Ibid. p. 308.
42 Joel Feinberg "Human Duties and Animal Rights" pp. 55-56 in On the Fifth Day edited by Richard Knowles Morris and Michael W. Fox.
43 James Rachels op. cit. p. 179.
44 Joel Feinberg op. cit. p. 53.
45 Ibid. pp. 55-56.
46 James Rachels op. cit. p. 220.
47 Ibid. p. 185.
48 Ibid. p. 67.
49 If a person, A, uses force to prevent another person, B, from treating an animal cruelly, A should be prepared to prove objectively in a court of law that he was acting in defense of legitimate rights. If he can prove that the animal has rights, I would like to see the proof so that I can revise this part of my theory of justice. Until then, I believe animal rights cannot be recognized as legitimate claims against moral agents.
50 James Rachels op. cit. p. 209.
51 Ibid. p. 209.
52 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia p. 39.
53 Robert Nozick, op. cit. p. 45.
54 Species do not have rights either as Joel Feinberg wrote (op. cit. p. 67):
... a species, unlike an individual animal, is not the kind of entity of which it even makes sense to say it can have rights. ... it has no interests of its own and is not even the kind of thing that could have a good of its own.
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